On the evidential relationship between color constancy theories and color ontology
While the question “What is color?” has been raised numerous times throughout history, the question of how to answer it has not received the same attention. This book tackles this methodological issue through one particular perceptual phenomenon, color constancy: a color constant organism sees an object as keeping the same color even when the illumination changes. The scientific theories trying to explain this marvelous feat have repeatedly been called upon to justify ontological theories of color, that is, theories trying to answer the very question “What is color?”. This book examines this evidential link and asks whether, and to what extent, scientific theories of color constancy can answer ontological questions about color. Contrary to prominent philosophers of color, who hold that there is little, if anything, to be learned from color constancy science on this matter, it argues that these theories are perhaps our best available evidence for answering such questions. Philosophers, it concludes, should devote most of their attention to studying them.